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ABSTRACT
The ancient Iranian belief in a mythological force that God bestows on kings in
the form of a mystical light that validates their rule, the farr-ī īzadī, has persisted in Iran
for millennia, and continues to influence Iranian concepts of leadership legitimization.
The Islamic conquerors who overthrew Iran’s Sassanian Empire in the seventh century
adapted this myth of Iranian sacral kingship to Islamic political culture, and used it to
build a distinct Iranian Islamic political identity that persisted through centuries of regime
changes. Iran’s Shi’i Muslims drew upon the concept of farr-i izadi in both of Iran’s
twentieth century revolutions, sometimes purposely, often probably totally
unconsciously, to forward their objectives. The Ayatollah Khomeini specifically relied
on the Iranian penchant for a supreme monarch endowed with a divine right to rule when
he converted Iran’s Islamic clerics into a new monarchical dynasty, with absolute power.
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INTRODUCTION
In the nineteenth century historians followed Leopold von Ranke’s dictum
that history should be understood as: was eigentlich geschehen ist.
Then perhaps it was the French positivists who declared, no,
history is the record of what people thought had happened.
In Iran history is the account of what people thought should have happened.
— Richard Frye 1
Iranian historiography often portrays the Zoroastrian and Islamic eras as
discontinuous. However, all societies uphold and regularly reaffirm the collective
sentiments based in history and mythology that provide their members with cultural
identity and unity, and Iranian society is no exception to this rule.2 After their seventh
century defeat of Iran’s Sassanian Empire, Islamic historians and religious theorists
brought together isolated myths and historical facts to create new genealogies for preIslamic rulers and a new chronology that explained the success of the Islamic conquest
and legitimized Islamic rule in Iranian terms.3 They assembled a new synthesis of the
Iranian ethos that defines “the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and
aesthetic style and mood—and their world view—the picture they have of the way things
1

Richard N. Frye, “Impressionistic Views of Ancient Iranian History,” Society of
Scholars of Zoroastrianism, 2006, http://s-s-z.org/work.htm (accessed April 2009).
2

Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward
Swain (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1915), 474.
3

Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and
Historiography (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 80-81.
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in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order.”4 This incorporation
significantly altered Iranian lieux de mémoire, the “…shared spaces of overlapping
beliefs and common historical tragedies” that crystallize the Iranian cultural heritage and
define Iranian collective memory.5
Collective memory is conveyed through literature and drama, which reflect a
society’s changes. These media are particularly useful for explaining accommodation to
conquerors and the “new” ideas they introduce. The Iranian national epic, the Shānāmeh,
and the Shi’i passion play, the ta’zīyeh, are the leading Iranian expressions of collective
memory in literature and drama. The Shahnameh, a tenth century epic poem that narrates
the ancient myths and legends that surround Iran’s kings and heroes, is the “one
indisputably great surviving cultural artifact that attempts to assert a continuity of
collective memory across the moment of the conquest.” It kept Iran’s pre-Islamic
legendary history alive, and “made it available to the Iranian people as a memorial of a
great and distinctive civilization.”6 The ta’ziyeh passion play links ancient Iranian
legends to the founding myth of Shi’ism, the death of the Imam Husayn at the Battle of

4

Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Anthropological Approaches
to the Study of Religion, ed. Michael P. Banton (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Press,
1966), 3.
5

Pierre Nora, ed., Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past, vol I,
Conflicts and Divisions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Kathryn
Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs: Cultural Landscapes of Early Modern Iran,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 136.
6

Dick Davis, “Introduction,” in Abolqasem Ferdowsi, Shahnameh: The Persian
Book of Kings, (New York: Viking, 2006), xxxiii.

3
Karbala in 680. It has therefore been key to the establishment of a unique Iranian Shi’i
identity by providing a memorial link to Iran as it was prior to the Islamic Conquest.7
The Iranian people used the Shahnameh and ta’ziyeh, along with additional lieux
de mémoire, to channel beliefs that “welled up from the depths of their inner beings into
molds that were not theirs but that had been imposed on them as a consequence of
military defeat and the adoption of a new religion and a foreign language.”8 They then
formed these new interpretations into a unique “Persianate conceptual frame” that
allowed them to maintain their cultural identity despite their adoption of a new religion.9
This enduring Iranian character had an undeniable impact on Islam, and it shaped Shi’ism
into a distinctively Iranian religion.10 Iranians gave themselves the “option to return to
the Persian past while experiencing the Islamic present” by adding pre-Islamic religious
principles into their version of Islam.11
The ancient Iranian principle of farr-ī īzadī played a key part in this process. The
farr-i izadi, ‘the splendor of God,’ is a mystical gift of legitimacy that Iranians
7

Ernest Tucker, Nadir Shah’s Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran
(Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2006), 20. Paul Kriwaczek, In Search of
Zarathustra: The First Prophet and the Ideas That Changed the World (New York:
Knopf, 2003), 223.
8

Ehsan Yarshater, “The Persian Presence in the Islamic World,” in The Persian
Presence in the Islamic World, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian and Georges Sabagh
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 95.
9

Babayan, Mystics,165.

10

Manochehr Dorraj, From Zarathustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in
Iran (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 9, 34.
11

Babayan, Mystics, 264.

4
traditionally believe God bestows on just leaders as a sign of his sanction. This
endowment, which has commonly been represented in Iranian mythology and
iconography as a radiant light, customarily gives Iranian rulers special strength and
insight, as well as the ability to overcome the forces of evil.12 Holding the farr means the
leader is responsible for just governance, maintaining religion, and ensuring his subjects
are well cared for; if he fails in these duties he risks losing the farr, and thus his throne, to
a more deserving ruler.13
The centrality of justice, a cult of martyrdom and charismatic, divinely sanctioned
kingship in both ancient and Islamic Iran brought the farr-i izadi “into the service of
Islamicate political culture,” and linked it to the Shi’i imams.14 The sociologist
Mohmoud Sadri postulates that this “mythological notion,” which helped shape “the
seventeenth century juxtaposition of the Shiite Utopian belief in the charismatic
government of the infallible Imams with the ideology of righteous stewardship of the
Safavid kings,” ensures Iranians maintain a “penchant for government by divine
approval.”15 It was because of this process that the farr-i izadi became an “atemporal
12

J. Kellens, “Avesta,” in Encyclopædia Iranica Online, http://www.iranica.com/
(accessed March 2009). Shusha Guppy, “The Spirit of Persian Monarchy,”
openDemocracy, http://www.opendemocracy.net / (accessed Feb 2008).
13

Abolala Soudavar and Milo Cleveland Beach, Art of the Persian Courts:
Selections From the Art and History Trust Collection (New York: Rizzoli, 1992), 411.
14

Dorraj, From, 10. Bertold Spuler, “Iran: The Persistent Heritage,” in Unity and
Variety in Muslim Civilization, ed. Gustave E. von Grunebaum (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1955), 175.
15

Mohmoud Sadri, “Sacral Defense of Secularism: Dissident Political Theology in
Iran,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 15, no. 2 (2001), 257-258.
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expression of divine authority” that is “deeply ingrained…on Iranian thought” and
continues to undeniably influence Iranian concepts of leadership legitimization.16

16

Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, “Contested Memories: Narrative Structures and
Allegorical Meaninings of Iran’s Pre-Islamic History,” Iranian Studies 29, no. 1/2
(1996), 162. Spuler, 175-176.
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THE FARR
A myth is, of course, not a fairy story. It is the presentation of facts
belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another.
— Gilbert Ryle 1
The farr-ī īzadī is a legendary principle of divine sanction that has served as a
symbolic source of legitimacy and stability for Iranian rulers since Zoroastrian times.2
Farr or farrah in modern Persian is commonly translated into English as splendor,
fortune or glory; izadi literally translates as “established by God’s will.” The farr-i izadi,
the “splendor of God” has its etymological roots in the concepts expressed in Old Iranian
as hvarnah; in the Avesta as xvarәnah, hvareno, or khvarenah; in Old Persian as farnah;
and in Middle Persian as kharreh. The notion of farr as an aspect of leadership
legitimization arose among the pre-Zoroastrian Aryan tribes of Eastern Iran sometime
between 900 and 775 BCE. It later expanded during the fifth to the third centuries BCE
under the Achaemenian Dynasty with the convergence of the Mesopotamian idea of
sacral kingship and Zoroastrian beliefs regarding the divine origins of leadership and
social order.3 The Sassanians, whose dynasty ruled over Iran from 224 CE until the
1

Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson’s University Library,
1949), 8.
2

Richard N. Frye, The Heritage of Persia (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Co,
1963), 40.
3

Jamsheed K. Choksky, “Sacral Kingship in Sasanian Iran,” Bulletin of the Asia
Institute 2 (1988), 35.

7
Islamic Conquest in the mid-seventh century, crystallized the concept into the enduring
Zoroastrian doctrine of sacral kingship known as the farr-i izadi, “the splendor of God,”
or simply the farr.
The Avesta, the Zoroastrian holy book that scholars generally agree was
constructed as early as the eleventh century B.C.E. but was not codified until the fourth
century C.E. under the Sassanians, identifies three different, but not distinct, types of
farr—all of the same essence, but of varying intensity. Yasht 18, “An Ode to the Divine
Glory” honors airiianәm xvarәnah—the farr that gives Iranians strength and helps them
protect their homeland from outlanders and demons. Yasht 19, “The Hymn to the Earth,”
praises axvarәtәm xvarәnah—the farr of the gods that all mortals should strive to realize;
and also extols the power of the kauuaēm xvarәnah—the farr of the legendary Kayānid
dynasty that conferred splendor and fortune upon kings and heroes.4
Although the farr consecrated the king—he was considered the “brother of the sun
and the moon,” and he reportedly descended to earth in a column of fire—he still needed
divine assistance and benevolence in order to remain in power.5 He was not a god, only
their representative on earth, where he served as a liaison between men and the gods and

4

“Avesta: Yashts (Hymns of Praise),” in Zoroastrian Archives, trans. James
Darmesteter, http://www.avesta.org/yasna/yasna.htm (accessed October 2008), Yashts 18
and 19.
5

Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion,
Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi’ite Iran From the Beginning to 1890
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 93

8
was often described on Persian coins as “deputy of gods on earth.”6 Darius I, the
Achaemenid emperor from 522 to 486 BC, included an acknowledgment of this humanity
in the foundation inscriptions at his Susan palace. His message reads: “Ahuramazda who
is the greatest of the gods created me. He made me king. … Such was Ahuramazda’s
pleasure that of the entire earth he chose me, a man.”7 However, not all Iranian kings
were as humble as Darius, and a leader’s pride and ambition could lead to loss of the farr
when the gods deem him no longer worthy of divine sanction.
The Denkard, the ninth century compilation of ancient Zoroastrian traditions,
relates the tale of King Jamshid (Yima), the last of the mythological Pishdadian kings,
who lost the farr as a result of hubris. Jamshid was initially given all three forms of farr
in their original united state, so that he could preserve the earth; however, after eighteen
hundred years as a just and benevolent ruler, he offended the gods by declaring himself
one of them. As a result of this “lie,” Mithra, the god of the covenant and guardian of the
farr, seized it from him, and Atar, the fire god, then took it to the bottom of the sacred
lake Vouru Kasha. The farr remains there, guarded in its undivided state by the god of
the waters, Apam Napat, who delivers just the Kayanid farr—the farr-i izadi—to
deserving rulers at their investiture.8
6

Choksky, 35. Abolala Soudavar, “The Vocabulary and Syntax of Iconography in
Sasanian Iran,” Iranica Antiqua 44 (2009), 422.
7

Inscription DSf 8-22, the “Foundation Tablet,” described in William W.
Malandra, An Introduction to Ancient Iranian Religion: Readings From the Avesta and
Achaemenid Inscriptions (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 50.
8

Vesta Sarkhosh Curtis, Persian Myths (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press,
1993), 25-26, 13-14, 17.
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Figure 1. Relief at Naqsh-e Rostam, “Ardashir Receiving the Farr”9

The farr of the Iranians was thereafter considered the property of the Iranian
people. It was inextricably bound to the destiny of each individual, allowing him to carry
out the duties appropriate to his social class. A man’s farr was linked to his intelligent
soul, and its vitality depended on his spiritual awareness—he could strengthen it through
strict observance of religious beliefs and rituals and by increasing his wisdom and virtue.
The king, as a member of the Iranian nation, also held this personal farr; “king” originally
“meant a man capable of realizing, in full awareness, his own destiny by developing his
inborn khvarenah”—what modern Iranians refer to as ṣafā-ī bāṭin, inner purity or
sincerity of mind and heart.10
9

Ahreeman X, “Persian Mythology, Gods and Goddesses: A Pictorial Research
and Guide,” Iran Politics Club, 2006, http://iranpoliticsclub.net/culture-language/
mythology1/index.htm (accessed Nov 2008).
10

Pio Filippani-Ronconi, “The Tradition of Sacred Kingship in Iran,” in Iran
Under the Pahlavis, ed. George Lenczowski (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press,
1978), 62-63. M. C. Bateson, et al., “Safa-Yi Batin: A Study of the Interrelations of a Set
of Iranian Ideal Character Types,” in Psychological Dimensions of Near Eastern Studies,
ed. L. Carl Brown and Norman Itzkowitz (Princeton, N.J: Darwin Press, 1977), 262, 269,
273.

10
Similarly, because kings were expected to train and serve as priests, the king also
held a share of the farr of the gods after it was placed in care of the priests. Ardashir, the
first Sassanian king, explicitly declared this relationship between the king and religion in
the instructions he passed down to his son, Shapur I:
Know that kingship and religion are twin brothers, no one of which can
be maintained without the other. For religion is the foundation of
kingship, and kingship is the guardian of religion. Kingship cannot
subsist without its foundation, and religion cannot subsist without its
guardian. For that which has no guardian is lost, and that which has no
foundation crumbles.11
This ideal association was commonly illustrated on Sassanian coins, with the bust of the
leader on one side, and the Zoroastrian fire alter on the other, thus making “church” and
“state” literally two sides of the same coin.12

Figure 2. Sassanian Drachm; Ardashir I (224 - 242 AD) and Zoroastrian Fire Alter.

13

11

Irach J. S Taraporewala, “Manichaeism,” Iran Chamber Society, 1980,
http://www.iranchamber.com/religions/articles/manichaeism2.php (accessed March
2009); translation from Shaul Shaked, From Zoroastrian Iran to Islam: Studies in
Religious History and Intercultural Contacts (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1995), I 214.
12
13

Choksky, 44.

“Gobl II Issue: Bust Right With Parthian-Style Headdress: Gobl Sn II/1/2;
Mitchiner ACW 787; Courtesy William B. Warden, Jr. Collection,” “Sassanian Coins” in
Grifter: A Splendid Thing, http://www.grifterrec.com/coins/sasania/sas_ardI_1.html
(accessed Apr 2009).

11
This bond was not total, however; the farr remained divided. At the end of time
the gods will reportedly bestow the undivided farr waiting in the depths of Vouru Kasha
on the Saoshyant, the final savior, who will lead mankind in the final battle of good
against evil and relieve humanity from sin, suffering, illness and death. 14 The Denkard
addresses this scenario with a description of how the farr of the gods and the farr of the
kings will come together in a single individual:
The thing against which the Evil Spirit struggles most vigorously is the
uniting, in full force, of the glories of kingship and the Good Religion in
a single person, because such a combination would vanquish him. …all
creation is joyful, and the people flourish…When these two glories unite
in one person, then the Adversary will be completely vanquished and
creation saved and purified….15
This vision of the utopia that will result from the unification of royalty and clergy has
profoundly affected the way Iranians view leadership legitimization up to the present day.
The Farr in the Shahnameh
Perhaps our most significant source for information regarding the farr-i izadi is
contained in the Iranian national epic poem, Abolqasem Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, a poem
of over sixty thousand rhyming couplets that relates Persian history and myth, and
specifically the stories of their kings and mythic heroes, from the creation of the world up
until the Islamic conquest. Ferdowsi wrote the Shahnameh over the course of about
thirty years at the end of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh centuries, during the

14
15

Filippani-Ronconi, 63.

The Pahlavi Dinkard, trans. D. M. Madan, (Bombay: The Society for the
Promotion of Researches into the Zoroastrian Religion, 1911), 129.18 – 130.16.

12
artistic and scientific resurgence that began under the Turkic Ghaznavid Dynasty that
ruled most of Persia, Trannsoxiania, and the northern regions of the Indian
subcontinent.16
Ferdowsi most likely used both oral and written sources for his mythical and
historical accounts; however, because none of the written sources have survived it is
impossible for scholars to do more than speculate on the subject.17 Iran’s rich storytelling
tradition, along with the fact that the Shahnameh and other Persian literature of its era are
more commonly recited than read make it highly likely that Ferdowsi gleaned at least
some of his material from oral accounts.18
Very little is actually known about the poet and his motivations for writing the
epic; what we do know is that the Shahnameh was written during a period of renewed
interest in Persian culture; that Ferdowsi neglects Islamic cosmology and chronology in
favor of the Persian myths on these subjects; that it was the first significant literary work
written in Persian after the Arab conquest and it is considered responsible for revival of
the Persian language; and that the poem “celebrate[s] the cultural and ethnic inheritance

16

Patrick Clawson, and Michael Rubin, Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 19-20.
17

Dick Davis, “Introduction,” in Abolqasem Ferdowsi, Shahnameh: The Persian
Book of Kings, (New York: Viking, 2006), xvi-xx.
18

Hamid Mahamedi, “The Story of Rostam and Esfandiyār in an Iranian Dialect,”
Journal of the American Oriental Society 102, no. 3 (1982).
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of ancient Iran.”19 As a post-Islamic text, the Shahnameh also conveys how the Iranians
viewed the Arabs and their introduction of Islam.
Ferdowsi’s portrayal of the evil King Zahak is often cited as reflecting the poet’s
own time and political situation, and his belief in the superiority of Persian culture over
the backward manners of their Arab conquerors. The story of how the wicked Arab
Zahak managed to seize the farr, but was then overthrown by Iranians led by an ordinary
blacksmith was proof that Iranians had “grown proud and decadent, had fallen to evil
foreign powers and had collaborated with those powers despite their tyranny,” and how
they could regain their identity “through the courageous leadership of individual people,
whatever their rank.”20 The Shahnameh thus kept the memory of the Old Persian Empire
alive in the Iranian people’s imagination, and helped maintain a sense of belonging to a
specific Iranian culture, of being a Iranian—iraniyyat.21
The Shahnameh has therefore become an incredibly important expression of
Iranian nationalism, a lieu de mémoire—a symbol “in which collective heritage…is
crystallized” and “in which collective memory is rooted.”22 Azar Nafisi describes the
19

Dick Davis, “Introduction,” in Abolqasem Ferdowsi, Shahnameh: The Persian
Book of Kings, (New York: Viking, 2006), xix.
20

Deirdre Lashgari, “‘Zahak the Dragon King’: An Iranian Allegory,” California
State Polytechnic University, 1992, http://www.csupomona.edu/~delashgari/readings/
zahak.html (accessed Oct 2008).
21

Ann K. S. Lambton, “Social Change in Persia in the Nineteenth Century,” in The
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Shahnameh as Persian “identity papers,” “the golden thread that links one Persian to the
other, connecting the past to the present;” and Michael Fischer explains how the parables
of the Shahnameh, when “Recited, retold, dramatized in live contexts…can and do
continue to inform and stalk the present” and help shape the Iranian national
consciousness.23 The farr-i izadi is one of the central aspects of Iranian heritage passed
down in the Shahnameh. The Iranian people—the vast majority of whom are at least
acquainted with the Shahnameh, can often recite long passages of the epic from memory,
frequently see paintings depicting its heroes on their coffeehouse walls, and regularly
refer to its characters and events in conversation—are therefore certainly familiar with
the farr that permeates its verses.
Ferdowsi portrays the farr-i izadi as a gift of legitimacy that just, righteous kings
are given as a sign of God’s approval. He alternately tells the stories of kings who lost
the farr because they did not rule in accordance with God’s wishes, generally when they
developed into tyrants. The Shahnameh consequently shows that the farr-i izadi is
unmistakably not permanent. The king does not rule by divine right, only with God’s
sanction, which he loses if he fails to properly carry out his duties; displays
incompetence, poor judgment, or, like Jamshid, hubris; or if he commits the most serious
offense—failing to serve his subjects with equanimity and justice.24
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Ferdowsi repeatedly describes this transitory, elusive nature of the farr-i izadi. He
weaves the tales of kings who were given the right of succession and legitimate rule
simply because they had won them in battle, a clear indication they had been anointed by
God. He also imparts the legends of their successors who were warranted in rebelling
against them after they succumbed to injustice and tyranny, thus losing the legitimizing
power of the farr-i izadi. These new rulers, often bolstered by a successful revolution
based in all classes of society, were considered legitimate simply by virtue of the fact that
they prevailed in the struggle for leadership—the only test for possessing the farr was the
ability to gain and maintain power.25
The new ruler was supposed to be from the royal family in order to have the farr
bestowed upon him, but if he was not, and he proved himself worthy, a new genealogy
would be fabricated for him. Cyrus the Great was given the farr and a modified lineage
as a reward for his military achievements when he overthrew the Median king, Astyages.
Alexander the Great received both the farr-i izadi and an invented Iranian ancestry when
he defeated Darius III in the Shahnameh; his achievement justified post-dating
recognition that the “royal farr” shone from his forehead long before the battle.26
Ferdowsi commonly represented the farr in this time-honored manner—as a
shining light that illuminated the ruler’s face, making it evident to all those around him
that he was clearly God’s chosen. Kings and heroes are universally described as shining
25
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like the sun or the moon; Kaymurs, the Shahnameh’s first king, “was like a tall cypress
tree topped by the full moon, and the royal farr shone from him.”27 Widengren, in his
historical account, similarly describes Sassanian rulers who covered their faces because
common people would not be able to stand the extreme light emanating from their faces,
and the ceremonial requirement for courtiers to put their hands over their eyes while
exclaiming “I am burning up” approaching the throne.28 This light was part of the farr’s
inherent nature, a reflection of the light of the gods, and its most familiar and enduring
symbol.29
Ferdowsi’s stories, and the symbols he popularized, helped make the theory of
farr-i izadi—the belief that God gives just kings of the proper lineage a divine light that
visibly displays legitimacy that he will take away and bestow on someone more
deserving if the king does not rule with justice and maintain the proper social order—
”one of the most enduring concepts of Iranian tradition and mythology” and a key aspect
of Iranian cultural identity.30 As a result, the king and his legitimizing farr have served as
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a rallying force for Iranians trying to preserve, as well as create, the unity and continuity
of their culture and nation, and it thus plays a prominent role in Iranian national history.31
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THE FARR-I IZADI AND IRANIAN SHI’ISM
The past is enlisted to serve the needs of the present.
— Rogers Brubaker 1
The seventh century Islamic conquest initiated a widespread acceptance of Islam,
and the collapse of Zoroastrianism as the national religion in Iran. However, this
introduction of a new faith was relatively gradual and voluntary, and it was not entirely
realized until the tenth century.2 As a result of this measured pace, the introduction of
Islam did not appreciably affect the continuity of Iranian history—the people never lost
their sense of iraniyyat, of belonging to a distinctive Iranian culture.3 Iranians were, and
still are, practiced at maintaining this awareness of their own unique identity while
adopting selected cultural norms and traditions from conquerors and non-Iranian
neighbors; and the Islamic invasion was no exception to this pattern. Iranians became
Muslims, but they were not “Arabized,” as were most of the other peoples overwhelmed
by the victorious Islamic armies during the same period. Iran instead “played a unique
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and crucial role in the origination and diffusion of institutions that eventually contributed
to the centripetal tendency of later Islamic civilization,” a process that has been described
as the “Persianization” of Islam.4
This synthesis resulted in an extensive record of parallels between pre-Islamic
Iranian religious thought and Twelver Shī’ism, the form of Islam that became dominant
in Iran; indicating what Dorraj refers to as a “line of continuity between the pre-Islamic
Iranian religious tradition and the historical development of Shi’ism” at the most essential
level.5 One clearly identifiable aspect of this continuity is the persistence of the principle
that God anointed the Iranian king with a special charisma that legitimized his
sovereignty—the farr-i izadi.
The Imams, the Mahdi and the Farr
Islam brought with it a new method for determining the rightful ruler, the concept
of caliphate. The Islamic caliph, literally ‘successor,’ inherited Muhammad’s
responsibilities as the spiritual leader and head of the Muslim state, but not his prophetic
role. Medinan tribal leaders elected the first caliph, Abu Bakr, after Muhammad’s death
in 632; however, many early Muslims believed Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law,
was the Prophet’s lawful heir. These Shi’at ‘Ali, partisans of Ali, or Shi’i, contend that

4

Mary Boyce, Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1979), 150. Richard W. Bulliet, Islam: The View From the
Edge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 11. Frye, Heritage, 233. Dorraj,
78.
5

Manochehr Dorraj, From Zarathustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in Iran
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 33.

20
only Muhammad’s direct descendents, through his daughter Fatima and Ali, were able to
pass on his charismatic legacy of divine sanction and are eligible to serve as caliph.6
The Shi’i were unable to wrest the caliphate away from the Umayyad Dynasty in
the seventh century; however, they continued to follow an Alid Imam as their rightful
spiritual leader, and recognized the caliph as a political leader with only borderline
legitimacy. They followed this pattern until 941, when the twelfth Imam, Muhammad alMahdi, reportedly went into “occultation,” a state of suspended animation that allows him
to continue to have authority over the community, and to guide and protect its members,
even though he cannot communicate with them. Iranians recognize this concept of
occultation in their recurring “myth of a hero believed to be dead, but who, either hidden
or asleep, awaits the time for his return.”7 The prime example of pre-Islamic Iranian
occultation is in the tale of Kay Khosrow, the Kayanid king who did not die, but instead
mysteriously disappeared into the side of a mountain, leaving his soldiers with the belief
that he might one day return to the world to restore justice.8
With their belief in the eventual return of the twelfth Imam, the Shi’i thus
developed the concept of the Mahdi, the Twelfth Imam who will come out of occultation
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and appear at the end of time as a prophet savior to help achieve the final victory of good
over evil and restoring universal justice to society.9 The nineteenth century French
Orientalist James Darmesteter wrote that this Shi’i doctrine of Mahdism is an Islamic
adaptation of the farr-i izadi, and that “The converted Persians had only to change the
proper names” in order to incorporate the concept into their version of Islam.10
Historian Bernard Lewis also traces the origins of Mahdism to ideas
…imported into Islam by the masses of imperfectly Islamised Persian
converts, who brought with them the Indo-Aryan idea of a chosen, Godbegotten family, transmitting the Glory of God (Farri Yazdan) from
generation to generation, and eventually producing a Saoshyant or
Messiah. This conception was transferred to the family of the prophet
and the personality of Ali.
With this inherited ‘divine light,’ Shi’i Imams were transformed into a new version of the
Zoroastrian Saoshyant, the savior who will receive the undivided farr at the end of time
and lead mankind in the final battle of good against evil.11
Both the pre-Islamic and Islamic belief systems therefore contain an activist
element, which urges believers to struggle for good against the forces of evil and
emphasizes free will that allows individuals to choose sides in this battle. This principle
that a true believer should always be engaged in a battle against evil manifested itself in
Iranian Shi’ism as a requirement for the faithful to permanently engage in a search for a
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just ruler to serve as a deputy to the Hidden Imam.12 Just as with earlier Iranian beliefs
regarding the farr-i izadi, it became honorable, and even a responsibility, for Iranian Shi’i
to defy and overthrow an unjust king.13
This tradition of resistance, which has its roots in the struggles of the early Shi’i
to make a member of Muhammad’s immediate family the Caliph, developed into what
historian Michael Fischer refers to as the “Karbala Paradigm.” This mindset is based on
the firm conviction that martyrdom in a struggle against injustice—following the
example of the Imam Husayn who, at the Battle of Karbala, knowingly fought against
impossible odds in a contest for the leadership of Islamadom—is the noblest cause in the
world; and that “the finest form of holy war is speaking out in the presence of an unjust
ruler and getting killed for it.”14 Iranian Shi’i have commonly used this principle to
encourage collective oppositional action. 15
The Karbala narrative includes additional stories, peripheral to the battle itself,
which provide leadership legitimization for the Shi’i Imams. One of these is the legend
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of Shahrbanou, reportedly the daughter of Yazdigird III, the last Sassanian king.
Shahrbanou’s tale appears in a variety of forms, ranging from the very simple to the
detailed and highly romantic. The latter commonly relate how the victorious Arab army
enslaved Shahrbanou during their invasion then took her to Medina, where Ali, the first
Imam, protected her from her Umayyad captors. She selected Ali’s son Husayn, the hero
of Karbala, for her husband, and is portrayed as mother of Zayn al ‘Abidīn, the fourth
Imam and one of the tragic figures of the Karbala storyline.
Shahrbanou binds “the House of the Prophet and the Twelve Imams with the
legitimate line of Iranian kings,” supplying the Shi’i Imams with both Islamic and royal
Iranian authority just as the stories in the Shahnameh give Alexander the Great and
Ardashir royal Persian pedigrees so they are eligible to have the farr bestowed upon
them.16 The legend of Shahrbanou is therefore one of the most significant links between
pre-Islamic Iranian kings and the Imams; it makes the ancient Persian kings ancestors to
the Imams, validating both their culture and sovereignty.17
The stories about Shahrbanou are commonly transmitted and accepted as
historically accurate, reflecting an innate desire to link the religious and royal heritages
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among the Iranian people.18 The historian Bāqir Sharīf Qurashī provides an eleven-page
description of the princess’ virtues, which is clearly intended to convey that the fourth
Imam was the son of a noble Iranian woman who was favored and chosen by God, and
not simply the child of an anonymous slave girl.19 Renowned Qur’anic scholar Ayatollah
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai also describes Shahrbanou without qualification as
“the queen among women, the daughter of Yazdigird the king of Iran,” indicating his full
acceptance of the legend, as well as his eagerness to provide the Imams with a royal
Iranian background and the legitimacy that ancestry entails.20
Abbasid propagandists took full advantage of the Shahrbanou legend, as well as
similar myths. They used the Iranian patriotism and loyalty they engendered to help rally
newly converted Iranian Muslims, unhappy with Arab rule, to their banner. With this
Iranian assistance, in the form of sectarian groups that supported the ‘Alids and their
nascent Shi’ism with doctrines based on “syncretistic currents of thought which aimed to
amalgamate indigenous Iranian religious traditions with aspects of Islamic teaching,” the
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Abbasids were able to overthrow their Umayyad rivals and establish themselves as a
hereditary dynasty in the mid-eighth century.21
The Abbasids followed the Sassanian governmental system, a centralized
government with a hereditary monarchy; and adopted Sassanian bureaucratic practices
and court protocols, including the concept of the farr-i izadi. Their caliphs were rarely
seen in public, and were “often qualified as luminous, in line with the light symbolism”
associated with the farr.22 The Abbasids held the Caliphate—at least nominally—until
the Mongol invasion in 1258 with the help of these Iranian concepts.
As the Abbasids extended their authority to the periphery of the empire, they
faced the difficulty of legitimizing their power in its vastly disparate regions. Their
caliphs initially met this challenge by allowing local Iranian leaders to sustain limited
power to help maintain order. This policy eventually led to the emergence of
autonomous or semi-autonomous Iranian states with separate political and religious
spheres of leadership legitimization, Iranian and Islamic.23
The Iranian legitimacy, derived from the farr-i izadi, also passed to the temporal
rulers of these independent states, who were invested with a “divine light” and therefore
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expected to wield political authority under celestial guidance.24 Their new title became
“the Shadow of God on Earth,” and they derived their Islamic power from the Abbasid
Caliph, who was considered heir to the “Mantle of the Prophet.”25 They also claimed
descent from, and similarities to, legendary Iranian kings and heroes; which provided
them with the legitimizing force of the farr-i izadi. The Ziyarids proclaimed themselves
members of the Sassanian royal family; the Tahirids and Samanids chose to fabricate
genealogies that linked them respectively to Rostam and Bahram Chubineh, heroes
whose exploits Ferdowsi relates in the Shahnameh.26 The Saffarid Dynasty, based in
Sistan, was founded in the late ninth century by Ya’qūb al-Saffār, the Coppersmith, who
styled himself after Kaveh the Blacksmith, the legendary Iranian hero who defied the evil
usurper Zahak. Kaveh offered his plebeian leather apron to Feraydun as a banner around
which the soon to be king rallied the Iranian people, and he reminded Feraydun that it
was his responsibility to ensure the Iranian people were served by a just king.27 The
victorious Feraydun adopted Kaveh’s apron as his dynasty’s standard and a
representation of its farr, and Kaveh became a symbol of Iranian nationalism that persists
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into the twenty-first century. Ya’qub took advantage of the many resemblances between
himself and Kaveh, some of which were not entirely fictional. He almost certainly did
not create the comparisons, and he was definitely not wholly responsible for
disseminating them. He was glorified by shu’ūbīyah poets who consciously played upon
Iranian cultural memories by fabricating his royal genealogy and praising him for
heroically serving “under the banner of Kaveh” to restore Persian glory.28
The first of the independent dynasties to embrace Shi’ism, the Buyids, originally
Caspian region Shi’i mercenaries, captured Baghdad in the mid-tenth century.29 They did
not, however, put an end to the Abbasid caliph, but allowed him to remain in place as a
religious figure that provided Islamic legitimacy without any political control. The
Buyids built an autonomous empire with traditional Iranian features, and embraced
Iranian culture in order to distinguish themselves from the Arab Abbasids. They claimed
royal Sassanian ancestry; observed traditional Zoroastrian festivals; and began using the
pre-Islamic Persian title for king, shah, as well as the imperial concept and designation
Shahanshah, king of kings.30
Despite the fact that the Buyids maintained the Caliph and Iran remained a Sunni
country with a great deal of anti-Shi’i activity; they also melded this Iranian culture into
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Shi’ism and created new customs that persisted in Iran even after the demise of their
dynasty. The Buyids introduced the Zoroastrian practice of saint worship into Shi’ism by
establishing the Imams as holy figures, sponsoring the erection of shrines for their burial
sites, and initiating the custom of making pilgrimages to those memorials. Along with
their sanction of Zoroastrian holidays the Buyids also instituted the Ghadīr Khumm
festival that commemorates the date on which Shi’i believe Muhammad recognized Ali
as his successor. Most significantly, on the tenth of Muharram 352 (8 February 963),
Shi’i were allowed to publicly observe the Imam Husayn’s martyrdom at the Battle of
Karbala. The Buyids institutionalized this commemoration, and initiated the tradition of
public mourning for Husayn.31
These ceremonies blend the Shi’i stories about Husayn’s martyrdom at the Battle
of Karbala with pre-Zoroastrian stories about, and public mourning ceremonies for,
Siyavush, the legendary Iranian tragic hero. Fischer states: “Mourning for Siyavush may,
in fact, have been a major annual ritual in ancient Central Asia, the original form of what
in Islamic Iran became the mourning for Husain.”32 The historian Narshaki describes in
his mid-tenth century history of Bukhara how “the people of Bukhara have special songs
or dirges about the death of Siyavush,” and the scholar Biruni, also writing in the tenth
century, describes how “At the end of the month of Akhshum the people of Soghd weep
and lament on account of their dead in former times and hit their faces and place food and
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drink for the dead, as do the Persians during the feast of Farvardagan.”33 The traditions
are too similar to be explained by coincidence; the “ritual, imagery, and emotive
underpinnings” reveal a clear link between ancient Iranian and Shi’i tradition.34
There is strong evidence that suggests this connection was intentional, and that it
was the result of attempts to reconcile the “tension between an active memory of preIslamic heroic epics and the unsung stories of Muslim heroes.” Iranians remained
attached to the Persian accounts of their mythical heroes and kings, despite the fact that
they had converted to Islam. The fourteenth century writer Shaykh Hasan Kashi was one
of those who recognized the utility of this attachment. He stated that “from courtier to
peasant their souls yearn, constantly craving Persian poetry,” so since “this is the order of
things,” he would tell the Islamic stories in the same manner in order to increase their
popular appeal. Kashi, along with other writers, very consciously wrote accounts of the
Imams, specifically Ali, in Persian poetry, complete with the symbols that related
“nobility, loyalty, honor and piety” in the Persian epic tradition.35
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Iranian Influences on Shi’i Doctrine and Law
Despite Sunni dominance in Iran prior to the sixteenth century there was
extensive Iranian influence on Shi’i doctrine and law; and the Iranian Islamic philosopher
Seyyed Hossein Nasr goes so far as to state that “Shi’ite Islam has an intimate connection
with the Persian soul.”36 Shi’ism arose in the city of Kufa, where many of the turbulent
events that characterize Shi'ism’s early history took place. More than two-thirds of
Kufa’s population was composed of Yemenis and Persians, who shared a tradition of
religio-political leadership based on sacral kingship with hereditary succession. These
ideas helped “set the trend of the city well on the road toward Shi'i inclinations and
moods of thinking.”37 Important centers for the development of Shi’i theology, such as
Qom, were in Iran; and many of the influential early Shi’ite theologians were Iranian.38
The renowned Shi’i hadith that were collected during the ninth and tenth centuries in
Qom and Baghdad under the independent dynasties is still the basis for much of Shi’i
law.39 Shi’ism developed its distinctive ethos during this period: “an attitude of mind
which refuses to admit that majority opinion is necessarily true or right,” as well as “a
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rationalized defence of the moral excellence of an embattled minority.”40 It was also
during this era that many of the ideas regarding the twelfth Imam’s leadership and
occultation took shape.
Buyid domestic strife allowed for Turkish encroachment and the formation of a
number of autonomous Turkish dynasties in eastern Iran. One of these, the Seljuqs,
conquered the Buyids and took over Baghdad in 1055. The Seljuqs “liberated” the
Abbasid Caliph from the Buyids; and, like their Buyid predecessors, kept him in place in
order to use his Islamic authority, along with borrowed Iranian ideas, to legitimize their
rule. The Sunni Seljuqs ensured adherence to Shi’ism diminished in Iran, but the
influence of Iranian ideas on Islam as it was practiced in Iran did not.
The Seljuqs, from their Iranian capital of Isfahan, restored mainstream Islamic
doctrine in Iran with the help of jurists and theologians who reinforced the bifurcation of
religious and temporal authority by invoking the Iranian concept of the farr. Nizām alMulk, the anti-Shi’i, Iranian, vizier to two eleventh-century Seljuk kings, opens his Rules
for Kings with the statement: “In every age and time God chooses one member of the
human race and, having endowed him with goodly and kingly virtues, entrusts him with
the interests of the world and the well-being of his servants.” He then advises that these
virtues and trust will disappear if “there occurs any disobedience or disregard of divine
laws on the part of His servants,” and God will bestow his good fortune, the farr-i izadi,
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upon a more worthy leader. Nizam al-Mulk also describes religion and kingship as “two
brothers,” echoing Ardashir’s description of the farr.41
Nizam al-Mulk appointed the jurist Abu Hamid Muhammad Ghazāli to head the
Baghdad Nizamiyyah madreseh in 1091.42 While serving in this capacity, Ghazali
attempted to combine Persian and Islamic traditions into a single, sequential historical
narrative that demonstrated the superiority of Islam.43 He states in his Counsel for Kings
that: “…kingship and the divine effulgence [farr-i izadi] have been granted to [kings] by
God, and they must accordingly be obeyed, loved and followed,” and he invokes the
Qur’an to back up this assertion: “To dispute with kings is improper, and to hate them is
wrong; for God on High has commanded ‘Obey God and obey the Prophet and those
among you who hold authority,’ which means (in Persian) obey God and the prophets
and your princes.”44 Ghazali and Nizam al-Mulk both tried to buttress Islamic kingship
with Iranian beliefs; however, by invoking the farr-i izadi they instead “perpetuate[d] the
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fundamental disharmony between the ideal of Islam and the ideal of pre-Islamic Persia”
by emphasizing the king’s absolute power and accountability only to God.45
Muhammad ibn al Hasan Tusi, known as Shaykh al-Ta’ifa and considered the
founder of Shi’i jurisprudence, reinterpreted Shi’i doctrine to allow for delegation of the
Imam’s judicial authority to the fuqahā, Islamic legal scholars. However he stated they
should only take on this responsibility if there was no one else available. Al-Ta’ifa
considered temporal leadership a distasteful duty for the fuqaha, and expressed his
preference for its delegation to kings with the statement: “The service of a ruler who
recognizes the true Imam and rules in his name according to the principles of Imami law
is not only unobjectionable but necessary” and entitled to fealty from the Shi’i
community.46 Al-Ta’ifa explicitly quotes Ardashir when he states that Muslim rulers
…are the regulators of the world, have control of the enactments of laws
and of the most expedient measures in daily life…. This is the reason for
the interdependence of faith and kingship, as expressed by the Emperor
of the Iranians, the Philosopher of the Persians, Ardashir Babak:
‘religion and kingship are twins neither complete without the other.’
Religion is the base and kingship the support: just as a foundation
without support avails nothing, while a support without foundation falls
into ruin, so religion without kingship is profitless, and kingship without
faith is easily broken.47
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Iranian ideas of sacral kingship were therefore, by the thirteenth century, firmly
entrenched as both a means for legitimizing Islamic rulers and an explanation for the
relationship between the shah and the hidden Imam.
Light Imagery and the Farr
Throughout these changes in religion and leadership, the farr acquired a variety of
post-Islamic representations and titles based on the old Sassanian concept present in the
collective Iranian consciousness; however, its most enduring icon is illumination.48 The
pre-Islamic farr was symbolized by a corona of light or fire around the king’s head, and
this representation persisted in Iran after the introduction of Islam. Figure 3, an
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illustration from a sixteenth-century Shahnameh, shows a classic example of this light
imagery with its representation of the Prophet Muhammad and the first three Imams with
blazing halos.50
This depiction of the farr as light or fire is also evident in a common Islamic and
Zoroastrian heroic motif. Mothers of heroes and kings are reportedly given its brilliance
long before their child’s birth; legends regarding Zoroaster and Muhammad’s mothers
illustrate the endurance of this imagery. The Zoroastrian Zadspram describes how the
farr came to Zoroaster’s mother:
About the glory of Zartosht becoming manifest even before his birth, it is
thus declared, that…it came down from the endless light, in the manner
of fire, and mingled with the fire which was before [Freno, Zoroaster’s
grandmother]; and from the fire it mingled with the mother of Zartosht.
For three nights it was manifest, to all passers-by, as a species of fire in
the direction of the house, and passers on the road always saw great
radiance. Also when she became fifteen years old, the radiance of that
glory which was in her, was even such that, on the path she was walking
along, its brightness was then shed by her.51
Ibn Ishaq similarly describes the farr, in his biography of Muhammad, as first
manifesting itself as a light on the Prophet’s father’s face “between his eyes…like the
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blaze of a horse,” and then moving to his mother, who saw “a light come forth from her
by which she could see the castles of Busra in Syria” after Muhammad was conceived.52
An Islamic version of the farr, with its light metaphor, was likewise passed from
Muhammad to his descendants, the twelve Imams who are revered by Shi’i as their
religious leaders. Along with their biological link to the Prophet they presumably passed
along his “special divine Light,” a “metaphysical substance” that provided the Shi’i
religious leaders with the innate ability to discern truth.53 The Imams are therefore
“reverenced as manifestations of the divine Light,” and are attributed “by virtue of their
lineage, an especial divine grace, like the royal Khvarenah,” in Shi’i mythology.54
Temporal rulers in the Iranian cultural area, under both Shi’i and Sunni dynasties,
also continued to metaphorically receive the farr in the form of a light from God. The
Iranian authority, derived from the farr-i izadi, invested the king with a “divine light;”
and he was therefore expected to wield political authority under celestial guidance.55
Emphasis was placed on the king’s designation as “the Shadow of God on Earth” and he
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derived his Islamic power from the central Caliph, who was considered heir to the
“Mantle of the Prophet” Muhammad.56
Abol-Fazl-e `Allāmi, vizier to the sixteenth-century Mughal emperor Akbar,
developed a formula for monarchical legitimacy that overtly spells out its reliance on the
farr. Abol-Fazl justified his emperor’s authority by stating:
Kingship is a light emanating from God, and a ray from the sun, the
illuminator of the universe; it is the argument of the book of perfection,
the receptacle of all virtues. Modern language calls this light Farr-e Izadi
[Divine Glory] and the tongue of antiquity called it Kayān Kharra
[Kayānid Glory]. It is communicated by God to kings without the
intermediate assistance of anyone, and men in the presence of it bend the
forehead of praise toward the ground of submission. 57
Abol-Fazl derived this guiding principle from the Iranian concept of the farr as outlined
by the twelfth-century Iranian Sufi philosopher Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardi Maqtūl.58
Suhrawardi’s theories began with a defense of Peripatetic celestial physics, but he
received an ecstatic vision that fundamentally changed his outlook. During this mystical
experience he
…saw this closed spiritual universe explode, and was shown the
multitude of those ‘beings of light whom Hermes and Plato
contemplated, and the celestial beams which are the sources of the Light
of Glory and of the Sovereignty of Light (ray wa khurrah) heralded by
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Zarathustra, towards which a spiritual rapture raised the most devout and
blessed King Kay Khusraw’ 59
After receiving this insight, Suhrawardi argued that the essences could only be
recognized and accepted as the result of direct, mystical experience.60 He came to the
conclusion that knowledge must go beyond formal education and be participatory,
experiential, and serve to unite the individual with God by understanding the Light of
Lights, from which all lesser forms of existence and sources of radiance originate.61
The majority of Suhrawardi’s ‘Philosophy of Illumination,’ which he described as
a resurrection of pre-Islamic Iranian wisdom, is devoted to explaining how anyone can
find their “inner spark” that connects them to God, a personal farr, through mystical
practice.62 His work also, however, bound “the prophetic tradition of Zoroaster and the
ecstatic holy sovereigns (Ferēdūn, Kay Kosrow), with the Semitic prophetic tradition of
the Bible and the Koran.” He achieved this by pointing out the “coincidence between the
concepts of the Zoroastrian “Light of Glory” (Xvarnah, Persian Korra), the
“Mohammedan Light” (Nūr-e Mohammadī), and the vSakīna (the Hebrew Shekhina,
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“Presence of the Divine Glory”) as the source of “prophetic charisma” and leadership
legitimization in these three religions.63
Suhrawardi’s Book of Radiance, written for the Seljuk Sulaymān Shah,
unambiguously addresses the legitimization of kings by defining the ideal temporal ruler
with the light symbolism of the farr-i izadi:
Whoever knows philosophy, and perseveres in thanking and sanctifying
the Light of Lights, will be bestowed with royal Kharreh [Kayanid Light]
and with luminous Farreh, and…divine light will further bestow upon
him the cloak of royal power and value. Such a person shall then
become the natural Ruler of the Universe. He shall be given aid from the
High Heavens, and whatever he commands shall be obeyed; and his
dreams and inspirations will reach their uppermost, perfect pinnacle.64
Suhrawardi specifically refers to the “Kayanid Light,” the farr of the kings, as distinct
from the “luminous Farreh” the farr of the gods that all people can obtain through
mystical introspection, indicating that the temporal kings who serve as “God’s
vicegerents on earth” must obtain both in order to rule with wisdom and justice.65
Suhrawardi thus reiterates the Sassanian king Ardashir’s declaration that the relationship
between the king and religion resembles that of twins who cannot live without one
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another, and reinforces the concept that the temporal ruler’s primary responsibility is to
maintain a just society in which Islam can flourish.66
The Mongol invaders who captured Baghdad in 1258 killed the Abbasid Caliph
and instituted their own methods for establishing royal legitimacy. However, like so
many of Iran’s former conquerors, they eventually adopted many aspects of Persian
culture, including the farr-i izadi—which was very similar to Mongol customs that called
for charismatic, divinely favored leadership. Like the later Mughal emperors, the
Il Khānid Mongol dynasty that ruled Iran from 1256 to 1349 developed a new theory for
legitimizing their kings based on Suhrawardi’s Philosophy of Illumination.67
One of the ways Il-Khanid shahs endeavored to further this supposition was by
commissioning illustrated copies of the Shahnameh that showed them as ancient Iranian
kings with the light of the farr. The most famous of these, the early-fourteenth century
Abu-Sa`id Shahnameh, commonly referred to as the Great Mongol or Demotte
Shahnameh, was an obvious “ attempt to enhance the legitimacy of Mongol rule in Iran
by infusing Ilkhānid history into the iconography of the Iranian national epic.”68 Their
kings are depicted as the poem’s heroic kings, with the light of the farr-i izadi in the form
of a solar disk or sunburst surrounding their heads.
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Figure 4. Illustrations from the Abu-Sa`id Shahnameh
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The Il Khanids also adapted and exploited the Shahnameh’s general themes, many
of which “conformed to Mongol history and traditions, and provided a common ground
between Mongol and Iranian epic history” to strengthen Mongol legitimacy.70 The
images in the Abu-Sa`id Shahnameh illustrate episodes in Mongol history as well as the
stories originally told in Ferdowsi’s epic. Figure 5 is an excellent example of this union.
It depicts the Shahnameh story about the Sassanian king Bahrām-e Gur and his brother
Narseh, the viceroy of Khorāsān; as well as the tale of how the Il Khanid Shah Ghāzān
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formally appointed his brother Uljāytu, also the viceroy of Khorāsān, his successor. The
illustration was intended not only to compare the Il Khanids to the ancient Iranian kings,
but also to bolster a false claim by the vizier Rashid-od-din Fazlollāh that Ghazan had
formally named his brother as his heir five years before his death. The royal brothers are
shown with shining halos that symbolize their farr, which is applicable to both the
Shahnameh and the “true” story.71

Figure 5. Bahram Gur appoints Narsi Viceroy of Khurasan
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The Safavid Synthesis
The Il Khanid government, with its relatively relaxed outlook regarding religious
diversity, allowed Sufis to freely practice their form of Islam. Many of the Sufi orders
had developed as a form of religious expression for the common people to “fill the gap in
the field of the esoteric side of Islam left vacant by Shi’ism,” and they therefore
developed a decidedly Shi’i orientation.73 Because of influence levied by these Sufi
orders and several outstanding Iranian Shi’i theologians, many Iranians gradually moved
toward Shi’ism. As a result, the leader of one of these Sufi orders, the Safavid Shah
Ismail who at the turn of the sixteenth century wrested Iran from Turco-Mongol rule, was
able to relatively swiftly transform Iran into a Shi’i state. 74
With the twelfth Imam’s occultation, “the legitimate exercise of power
disappeared from the world,” and the Shi’i therefore have a tendency to consider all
temporal governments “irredeemably usurpatory,” and have consistently avoided
developing a comprehensive definition of what comprises a state’s legitimacy during the
twelfth Imam’s absence.75 However, they were pragmatic enough to concede that
because of the Imam’s occultation his political authority has temporarily lapsed, and they
afforded leaders who attempted to govern in accordance with Islamic principles a certain
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degree of legitimacy in order to maintain “domestic tranquility” and avoid anarchy.76
Twelver Shi’ism, while denying “legitimacy in the ultimate sense,” considers a temporal
ruler, “a necessity for order and prosperity”—a necessary evil.77 The Imamate therefore
lost most of its political power and become almost a purely religious concept, and
sovereignty was split between the caliph and the king.
Although the religious authority had gone into occultation with the Twelfth Imam,
Shi’i philosophers and mystics continued to believe in an “uninterrupted chain of human
mediators acting as spiritual representatives of the Hidden Imam.”78 Iranians, both Sunni
and Shi’i, were always in search of a “true leader” endowed with a God-given charisma
that manifested itself in light, a clear reflection of the farr of the gods. Ismail Safavid
took advantage of these convictions and formally introduced Shi’ism, with its many
similar tenants, into Iran’s governmental structure as a legitimizing factor for Iranian
kings.79 He claimed descent from the Seventh Imam, Musa al-Kazim, with a falsified
genealogy, and declared that because of this heritage he was destined to rule as a Shi’i
monarch on behalf of the Hidden Imam. Ismail accordingly recombined the temporal and
religious lines of legitimacy by appealing to Iranian and Shi’i messianistic mythology.
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Ismail overtly proclaimed himself a defender of Iran’s past and heir to the glory of
its former, non-Islamic kings and heroes as well as its Islamic heritage. He consequently
reinvigorated the concept of the farr-i izadi, with the process Roger Savory drolly
describes as having it “so to speak, taken out of the closet, dusted off and reinvested with
all its former splendor as the zill allāh fi‘l-arzi or ‘Shadow of God upon Earth.’”80 Ismail
proclaimed at his coronation that: “Today I came down to the earth: I am lord and king!
Know as true that I am Haydar’s son! I am Fereydoon, I am Khosrow, I am Jamshid, I
am Rustam, son of Zal.” By invoking the name Haydar, a designation for Ali, the first
Shi’i Imam, and also the name of his own father, Ismail claimed his right to rule as a Shi’i
Imam; by calling upon Feraydun, Khosrow, and Jamshid, pre-Islamic Iranian kings all
glorified in the Shahnameh, and on Rostam the mythic hero of the epic, he claimed the
farr-i izadi.81
Safavid shahs, including Ismail, did not, however, entirely merge temporal and
religious authority. They delegated administration of religious issues to a deputy, the
sadr, a position that had been created a century earlier by the Timurids. The sadr was
responsible for administering the legal system and religious endowments, and for
spreading and enforcing the Shi’i faith. The monarch appointed and paid the sadr, and
could dismiss him—and those who worked for him—at will. This power allowed the
Safavids to develop religion into a political tool by forcing the ulama into a bureaucratic
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organizational structure and controlling their operations along with those of the state.82
However, when the dynasty collapsed in 1722 after an Afghani rebellion, the clerics
withdrew from the political arena and developed a disregard for political involvement,
and as a result they were able to obtain relative freedom from state control.
The Farr in Post-Safavid Iran
Afghani rule over Iran was short-lived. Nadir Qoli, the orphaned son of an Afshar
tribal peasant, rallied a coalition of Khorasani bandits and mercenaries in support of
Tahmasp Mirza, the son of the last Safavid shah. Nadir defeated the Afghans in 1726,
and allowed Shah Tahmasp, “an ineffectual, lazy, vindictive alcoholic,” to hold the
Iranian throne for six years before declaring him unfit and replacing him with his infant
son.83 Nadir then, with personal charisma and a successful military record, deposed the
child shah and established his short-lived Afsharid rule in 1736.84
Nadir Shah did not go to the trouble of creating a false genealogy to establish
himself as a descendent of the Imams or a member or an Iranian royal family; and he
even tried to “effect a definitive break with Safavid rule and its principles of legitimacy
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of kingship,” as well as with Shi’ism in general.85 However, although Islamic political
theorists did not view his exercise of imārat al-istilā, “government by someone whose
mere control of a territory legitimized his rule of it” as a sole reason for legitimization, it
was perfectly congruent with the Persian concept of farr-i izadi. Additionally, at this
point in Iran’s history a shah’s legitimization depended more on “how well he provided
for his subjects’ welfare and defended them,” and even more on “how he supported a
Shi’i clerical hierarchy as it developed more and more autonomous power and status.” 86
The dual line of legitimacy had become more entrenched, and the accepted belief was
that kings were needed only to preserve order for the ulama, the protectors of religion.87
The Qajar Dynasty that emerged in 1779 explicitly restored these two separate
lines of authority, a standard that continued until the Ayatollah Khomeini merged them
back together two hundred years later.88 The Qajars did not try to bolster their legitimacy
with claims of descent from the Imams, nor did they claim be agents of the twelfth
Imam.89 They did, however, like so many of their predecessors, create a fictitious history
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that traced their lineage back to Iran’s ancient rulers, revealing a desire to legitimize their
rule by claiming the farr-i izadi.90
The Qajars also tried to reinforce their legitimacy with royal sponsorship of the
ta’ziyeh passion plays, and it was during their era that the ta’ziyeh was formalized and
institutionalized in Iran.91 The ta’ziyeh, which literally translates as “mourning,” reenacts the slaughter of Husayn, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, and his righteous
followers by the Umayyad army under the command of the evil Yazid during the Battle
of Karbala, which took place about 60 miles south of modern Baghdad in 680. Ta’ziyeh
performances range from the extremely sophisticated with professional actors, expensive
costumes and elaborate sets to simple street dramas performed by local amateurs with
makeshift—or no—costumes. The thing they all have in common is that they evoke
strong emotional responses from their audiences, similar to the one Kriwaczek describes:
…many in the audience, both men and women were crying bitterly, real
tears streaming from their eyes, their shoulders heaving with sobs; burly
men with rifles over their shoulders were wiping their damp, unshaven
cheeks with huge bandana handkerchiefs. This was no play-acting, no
demonstration of religious piety for the sake of the clergymen in the
crowd…. I was seeing real, genuine, unashamed weeping that could
only possibly come from the heart.92
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Kriwaczek goes on to explain how members of the crowd described the story behind the
performance as a fight between good and evil that never ends in a manner similar to those
outlined in Zoroastrian beliefs.
Dabashi describes the ta’ziyeh as a medium in which “reality and fiction are
counternarrated,” and “art and politics [are] almost impossible to separate.” The ta’ziyeh
brings the thirteen hundred year old tragic events that took place at the Battle of Karbala
into the present. Historical events and their remembrance are “collapsed into each other”
in the ta’ziyeh, “preventing a sympathetic distancing of the audience from the fact of the
event.”93 The ta’ziyeh also creates a sense of timelessness, a space in which there is
“…no difference between the past and the present. An event that was told as
remembered happening in history 1,300 years ago actually became a reality in that
moment,” and history and myth are blended into present events.94
Iranians have often used the ta’ziyeh’s themes and its ability to fold the past into
the present to encourage collective oppositional action.95 During the 1906 Constitutional
Revolution mullahs who supported the revolution “whispered in the neighborhoods that
the Qajar tribe had assisted Yazid in his war against the sons of Ali” in order to discredit
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the Shah and imply that his family had never received God’s sanction to rule.96 These
revolutionary clerics believed a Western-style constitution would help ensure the
government did not defy Islamic law.97
There were also many critics of constitutional government among the ulama; one
of the most outspoken was Shaykh Fazl Allāh Nūri, a Tehrani mujtahīd. Nuri’s
Refutation of the Idea of Constitutionalism called upon God to bless the Shah, asking him
to “corroborate our king and his army; eternalise his life; immortalise his kingship and
rule; and establish him on the straight path.” Nuri also stated that religious and temporal
rule were sometimes given to a single person, but were more often divided; that
…two authorities are complementary and supplementary to each other,
that is to say, the foundation of Islam is laid upon these two [sets] of
affairs: deputyship in the affairs of prophecy and kingship. Without
these two, Islamic provisions would be inactive. As a matter of fact,
kingship is the executive power of Islamic provisions, and doing justice
depends on executing them.98
However, even the triumphant revolutionaries, both secular and religious, did not
abandon the monarchy and its legitimizing farr with the 1906 Constitution. They allowed
the Shah to insert the sentence “Kingship is a gift that with divine will is bestowed upon
the person of the king by the nation” into the 1906 Supplementary Fundamental Law—
making the Iranian nation the means through which God’s farr would be conferred upon
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the Shah.99 The end result of the 1906 Revolution therefore created an explicit link
between the ancient farr of the Iranians and modern nationalism, a connection the
upcoming Pahlavi shahs tried to capitalize on in their pursuit for legitimacy.

99

Ahmad Ashraf and Gherardo Gnoli, “Iranian Identity,” in Encyclopædia Iranica,
ed. Ehsan Yarshater (London: Routledge & Kegan, 2006), 527.

52

THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY AND THE FARR
Nothing is more difficult than competing with a myth.
— Françoise Giroud 1
In the years immediately following World War I, Iran’s new constitutional
government was struggling to overcome the war’s devastation. Iran had served as a
battlefield for Russian, Ottoman, German and British soldiers—as much as a quarter of
the civilian population died either during the fighting or as a result of its devastation,
which included a crippling famine and epidemic disease. Nationalist movements that
might have developed a program to restructure the government were overcome not only
by the effects of the war but also by territorial infighting; the lack of urban development;
and primitive, insecure roads. Centralized economic structures were factionalized; and
foreign powers, specifically Great Britain and the Soviet Union, contributed to the
confusion by pressing to obtain ever-greater control of the country.2
A Cossack Brigade Commander, Reza Khan, took advantage of this chaotic
situation in February of 1921. He used his military might to stage a coup and place the
pro-British journalist, Sayyid Zia al-Din Tabatabai in power as Prime Minister. Reza
1
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Khan then installed himself as army commander, and elevated himself to Minister of War
in April, thus firmly establishing his power base. The new government promised land
reform, national independence and an industrialized economy; annulled the AngloPersian treaty; and restored relations with the Soviet Union on a seemingly equal basis.
Reza Khan focused on strengthening the Army, and he used its new capability to quickly
replace Sayyid Zia with Qavam as-Saltaneh and to continue consolidation of real power
in his own military might.3
The formal government focused on suppressing tribal discord, trade union protest,
and all other forms of opposition. Reza Khan took over as Prime Minister in 1923 and
continued his machinations aimed at centralizing political power in his own hands. In
1925 he successfully obtained both clerical and majles support for his bid to depose the
Qajar Dynasty and replace them with his own Pahlavi Dynasty, styling himself Reza
Pahlavi Shah.4
British diplomat, Victor Mallet, described how Reza’s rise to power conformed
with earlier dynastic changes: “Persian history presents many examples of such changes;
indeed the Kajars themselves came in on a revolution, while Nadir Shah rose…in a very
similar way….”5 Reza Pahlavi Shah was thus “…not a usurper from the standpoint of
Iranian history and society, which had always lacked a continuous aristocracy, and where
3
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rebellion was always justified by its success;” he was the “imposing warrior ‘come out of
the mountains,’ like Ardashir Papakan, founder of the Sassanian dynasty, or Arshak, the
first of the Parthians, or—mythically—like the future Savior-Heroes…presently asleep in
the mountains of Tabaristan.”6 Reza Pahlavi established his dynasty and the opportunity
to begin the modernization of Iran by first obtaining a charisma that distinctly resembled
the traditional farr-i izadi.
Under the Pahlavis, for the first time in Iranian history, the central state extended
its reach to the local, village level. However, in the process, the two Pahlavi shahs set
themselves against all sectors of Iranian political culture by dramatically enlarging the
state bureaucracy while simultaneously canceling all social support.”7 Reza Pahlavi’s
primary concerns were secularization and modernization; he introduced new civil and
criminal law codes, abolished the shari’a courts, limited religious courts to only dealing
with divorce and marriage, instituted property registration laws, and forced western dress
and the unveiling of women. All of these actions alienated both the clergy as well as
ordinary Iranians, primarily those in the urban working class. Reza Pahlavi’s
“Modernization from Above” also included land, civil service, military, educational,
economic, banking, taxation, and foreign trade reforms, as well as infrastructure
improvements. However, he forced these reforms without also restructuring the old
6

Homa Katouzian, State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the
Emergence of the Pahlavis (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 337. Pio Filippani-Ronconi,
“The Tradition of Sacred Kingship in Iran,” in Iran Under the Pahlavis, ed. George
Lenczowski (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 81.
7

Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1989), 14- 15.

55
agrarian organizations or making any changes that would benefit the lives of the
peasants; in fact, peasants were burdened with higher taxes and with greater military
obligations than before. He also took action against opposition with either terror or
incarceration.8
Reza Shah, in the midst of his determination “to remove the influence of religion
from politics” and to “undermine the political influence of the clerics,” tried to force
modernization on Iranian society.9 As a result, he conformed to the traditional archetype
of the unjust king—a tyrant unconcerned with protecting religion who has lost the
farr-i izadi. When faced with this reality, in the form of a 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion,
Reza Shah took the example of many of his predecessors described in the Shahnameh and
chose abdication in favor of his son, Muhammad Reza.10
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi recreated many of his father’s worst mistakes. He
pushed through his “White Revolution” (a six-point reform program that called for land
reform, sale of government-owned factories to finance this land reform, a new election
law including women’s suffrage, nationalization of forests, a national literacy corps, and
a plan to give workers a share of industrial profits) with a plebiscite in 1963. The White
Revolution did not exempt religious endowments from land reform if they produced
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income; it therefore had the potential to drastically limit religious incomes. Prominent
religious jurisconsults did not openly oppose land reform, it was too popular with the
masses they were working to influence—they focused instead on challenging women’s
suffrage and the practice of allowing elected officials to swear their oaths of office “by
the holy book” instead of “by the Qur’an.”11 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, then a
teacher at the Faiziyeh madreseh in Qom, publicly denounced the Shah for his reforms.12
The Shah retaliated, and played into Khomeini’s hands, by attacking the Faiziyeh
madreseh in March of 1963; a number of students were killed or injured.13 Khomeini led
demonstrations (in the form of funerals and memorial ceremonies that are traditionally
held forty days following a funeral) against the Shah that coincided with Moharram and
the year’s Ashura commemorations.
These demonstrations spread throughout the country, and Khomeini thus was able
to very successfully use Shi’i protest and martyrdom symbolism from the ta’ziyeh
dramatic presentations, as well as the ancient Iranian theme of just kingship in this initial
skirmish. One of the most often used slogans was “Imam Husayn, protect us from
injustice,” and Khomeini warned that “Islam [was] in danger” when he likened the Shah

11

Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran (New
York: Pantheon Books, 2007), 244.
12

Peter Avery, et al., The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), 279-281. Keddie, Modern Iran, 145, 147.
13

There is a wide range of speculation regarding the actual casualty numbers, the
most precise statement that can be made is that at least one student was probably killed.

57
to the evil Yazid in his sermons and speeches.14 A number of Khomeini’s students and
followers were killed during the course of these demonstrations, and Khomeini was
arrested, thus deepening Khomeini’s association with the Karbala stories by forging a
“catalytic link” between Khomeini and Husayn.”15
As part of his insecurity, Muhammad Reza first retaliated with actions that very
effectively alienated the politically active Shi’i clergy, arresting and executing some of
their most vocal members. He did not, however, permanently imprison or execute the
one leader who, in retrospect, it seems he most needed to silence—Ayatollah Khomeini.
Khomeini was left free after 1964 to openly denounce the Pahlavi regime from exile in
Iraq.16 The Shah then tried desperately to maintain his legitimacy, primarily by
glorifying himself and Iran’s ancient heritage in the name of nationalism.
These attempts were notoriously unsuccessful. Most notable was the 1971
international extravaganza Muhammad Reza staged to celebrate the twenty-five hundred
year anniversary of Cyrus the Great’s supposed founding of the Iranian nation, and to
emphasize the Pahlavi Dynasty’s link with this glorious leader. The Shah intended to
underscore his status as Āryāmehr, the Light of the Aryans, in possession of the
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farr-i izadi.17 However, the incredibly expensive spectacle attended by over 70 world
leaders only impressed the Iranian people with the fact that “the shah had spent $300
million on makeshift silk tents with marble bathrooms, and on food and wine for twentyfive thousand people, flown in from Paris.”18 As a result, many labeled it a “ridiculous
farce” and considered the fact that the Iranian public had not been invited to the

Figure 6. 1971 Celebration of 2,500 Years of Iranian Monarchy 19

ceremonies as a “sign of imperial arrogance.” Foreign journalists took time away from
being feted to document the poverty surrounding the opulence and used the contrast in
their documentaries to characterize the Shah’s negligence. Khomeini labeled it the
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“Devil’s Festival,” and asked, “What happened to all these gilded promises, those
pretentious claims…that the people are prosperous and content?” The Shah’s attempt to
invoke ancient Iranian symbols and hold on to the farr had foundered; however, he
refused to acknowledge this fact.20
The 1978-79 Islamic Revolution hinged on Khomeini’s charisma, and the Shah’s
lack of it. In 1973 the Shah stated that he had “been chosen by God to perform a task.
My visions were miracles that saved the country. My reign has saved the country, and it
has done so because God was on my side.” However, by 1978 Richard Cottam cites the
Shah’s loss of personal control as “the most important accelerating force” behind the
disintegration of the Iranian state’s institutional base for peaceful succession of power,
and lists an impressive array of economic measures that indicate Iran had not been “saved
by a miracle.”21
To seal the Shah’s fate, Khomeini and his followers successfully enlisted ancient
symbols and motifs to convince the Iranian people that their Shah, by failing to protect
physical and spiritual needs of the people, had lost the farr-i izadi, and that the Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini had received it.22
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KHOMEINI, VILAYET I-FAQIH AND THE FARR
The terrible charisma of kings…men crept close, longing to bask in it, for
something more than material reward. The lure of heroism, the benediction of
action, might have only death for its prize, and yet men flocked to the king’s banner.
[Is it] the seductive promise of perfection in service to this bright-seeming thing?
— Lois McMaster Bujold 1
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his followers skillfully exploited Iranian
cultural images and symbols in a modern, nationalist context to gain and consolidate
power during and after the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution. They “carefully and
deliberately” drew images “from the depth of Persian historical memory” to build a
“collective fantasy” that “gave the masses a sense of personal integrity, collective
identity, historical rootedness, and feelings of pride and superiority” when they
constructed Khomeini’s authority.2 Because of this reliance on Iranian collective
memory, it appears Khomeini did not modernize Shi’ism with his revolutionary
conception of Islamic government: vilayet-i faqih, governance by the jurist. With
vilayet-i faqih Khomeini instead reached back into the past and claimed the farr-i izadi;
and his followers used Islamic manifestations of this ancient Iranian concept to mobilize
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support, characterize the revolution’s villains and heroes, provide their demonstrations
with the necessary drama to gain power, and to legitimize Khomeini’s theocracy.
The Islamic Revolution began with protests against the Shah by a variety of
groups, with vastly disparate ideologies. However, in the final months prior to the Shah’s
departure in January of 1979 most of the Revolution’s actors perceived it as a crusade for
justice against Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s tyranny. The conflict between the Shah
and the Ayatollah was rooted in the pre-Islamic belief that it is the king’s obligation to
support religion, and that if he does not he will lose the legitimizing force of God’s
sanction—the farr-i izadi.
Soudavar brings this central struggle of the Islamic Revolution into historical
focus with his assertion that “Persians intuitively evaluate the intensity of their leaders’
Divine Glory and shift their loyalties accordingly,” and Persian history is rife with
examples of “opportunistic shifts of allegiance.”3 Khomeini triumphed in this contest for
legitimacy with rhetoric that portrayed the Shah as a tool of western imperialism, an
enemy of religion, and “an impious brute with loose moralities” who no longer had God’s
approval.4 Khomeini then, with a “contemporary manifestation of ancient doctrine”
recombined temporal and religious rule, and took the Shah’s place as the head of the
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Islamic Republic of Iran.5 The revolution therefore “fundamentally transform[ed] the
very basis of governance, the relationship of citizens to laws, the organizing principles
and social contracts along which society is conducted” by changing a central notion of
Shi’ism—the rejection of all temporal governments as illegitimate so long as the twelfth
Imam remains in occultation.6 The means by which this transformation was
accomplished was Khomeini’s philosophy for leadership legitimization, vilāyēt-i faqīh,
guardianship of the jurisconsult.
Khomeini’s plan is ostensibly based on the work of two prominent Shi’i jurists,
Mullah Ahmad Narazi (d. 1829) and Shaykh Muammad Husayn Nā’īnī (d. 1936).7
However, he took these theories regarding vilayet-i faqih out of context and far beyond
their original intentions; and he did not reconcile them with the classic Islamic legal
sources, which only provide the clergy with the authority to give rulings in technical
disputes, not to exercise sovereign rule.8 Additionally, although these earlier writers
hinted at the concept of clerical leadership, they did not have a strong or clear basis for
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their work in the Shi’i Traditions, religious rule was not one of their central themes, and
no Shi’i cleric prior to Khomeini claimed political authority other than advising rulers
and kings to ensure they complied with shari’a law.9
Khomeini’s proposal for vilayet-i faqih expected the ulama to do a great deal
more than simply provide guidance; it called for them to assume the king’s role, and his
power. Khomeini believed that there is no place in Islam for temporal rulers, who he
considered “historical aberrations.” He stated that kings had stymied the emergence of
true Islamic government since the days of the Imam Ali, and in modern times they have
simply been tools of western imperialists.10 He went so far as to state that the “separation
of religion and politics,” an Iranian tradition ensconced in both Zoroastrian and Islamic
mythology, had actually been “formulated and propagated” by imperialist powers to prop
up their puppet Shah and steal Iranian resources.11
Khomeini’s alternative to monarchy, as stated in his treatises on vilayet-i faqih, is
that a just faqīh, an expert in Islamic jurisprudence (pl. fuqaha), chosen by acclamation,
should rule with near absolute authority over the Iranian state as its supreme Leader.12
Khomeini believed fuqaha who have obtained the rank of marja, source of emulation,
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inherently hold “executive power,” the authority referred to in the Qur’anic verse “O you
who believe, obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority from among you”
(4:59). They should therefore be entrusted with the “divine right” to govern because their
knowledge of Islamic law provides them, and only them, with the ability to serve as just
rulers.13 Khomeini’s vilayet-i faqih is thus an institutionalized way of ensuring that only
a cleric is eligible to receive the legitimizing force of the farr-i izadi in order to obtain
and maintain power in an Iranian Islamic state.
Khomeini supported his arguments for vilayet-i faqih by redefining infallibility,
which Shi’ism doctrinally characterizes as residing only in the Twelve Imams, to simply
“the product of faith.”14 He claimed the Twelve Imams are infallible, and therefore the
logical rulers, not because they are members of an exclusive, divinely chosen group
descended from the Prophet, but because their faith, in the form of “asceticism,
acquisition of illumination, and virtuous dispositions” allowed them to see themselves “in
the constant presence of God.”15 Khomeini made the Imams’ inherited infallibility
irrelevant to their leadership legitimization; and this allowed him to argue that anyone
who achieved this mystical, illuminative goal of perfection—a state remarkably similar to
the farr-i izadi—was qualified to rule Iran.

13

Khomeini, “Islamic Government,” 353.

14

Khomeini, “Lecture on the Supreme Jihad,” in Islam and Revolution, 353.

15

Dabashi, Discontent, 463-465. Homa Katouzian, “Legitimacy and Succession in
Iranian History,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 23, no.
1 (2005), 238.

65
Khomeini’s conception of vilayet-i faqih institutionalized this mythical metaphor
within a modern governmental structure. According to the ancient Iranian prescription,
rulers established the fact that they had been endowed with the farr-i izadi by seizing and
holding on to power, and the Iranian people acknowledged their status with popular
consent. When rulers were no longer able to command authority, usually after they
became unjust tyrants, they were presumed to have lost the far and their ability to govern,
and it was the people’s responsibility to oppose such rulers. A new leader, obviously
endowed with the farr, would then arise, seize power and gain approval from the people.
Vilayet-i faqih likewise instituted a system in which rulers are supposedly chosen
by acclamation after successfully displaying their innate leadership ability. Khomeini
personally met both of these tests. The Iranian Constitution as adopted in 1979
accordingly refers to Khomeini’s personal charisma as a necessary attribute for future
leaders, attributes it to his status as the most learned faqih, and therefore limits eligibility
to the clergy with the statement:
“Whenever one of the fuqaha possessing the qualifications…is
recognized and accepted as marja and leader by a decisive majority of
the people—as has been the case with the exalted marja’i taqlid and
leader of the revolution, Ayatullah al-Uzma Imam Khomeini—he is to
exercise governance and all the responsibilities arising therefrom.”16
Khomeini, by enshrining vilayet-i faqih in the new constitution with his explicit example,
attempted to ensure future leaders would be chosen in the same manner that he was: by
displaying that they had the Grace of God—the traditional Iranian farr-i izadi.
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Iranian Cultural Memory
Khomeini would certainly never have admitted to this, even if he had consciously
intended it. But what he believed and said about himself is not really important; the
“Construction of a collective revolutionary myth need not be a conscious and deliberate
act,” and it does not matter if the “Pieces of the mythological puzzle” are accidentally or
purposely arranged, or who puts them together.17 In Khomeini’s case what is significant
are the cultural myths and ideals that his followers believed in, and the ways the Iranian
people projected these beliefs onto him, much as they had upon Ya’qub the Coppersmith
in the ninth century.
Khomeini’s intense charisma allowed him to develop a unique relationship with
his supporters that went far deeper than what was common for a high-ranking Shi’i cleric.
He was able to tap into and exploit a “Mystical universe of shared sentiments” composed
of “Mental pictures of communal and doctrinal origin, on one hand, and social and
political realities, on the other” that resided “at the most sublimated levels of
subconsciousness.” It is from these the icons of the Iranian collective consciousness that
he created his image as the ultimate Shi’i champion of justice.18
The sociologist and revolutionary Dr. Ali Shariati popularized a nineteenth
century saying during the early days of the Revolution: “Every place should be turned
into Karbala, every month into Moharram, and every day into Ashura.” Khomeini
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embraced this sentiment as his own.19 As Swenson aptly summarizes the situation: “The
utilization and manipulation of symbols and rituals in the martyrdom idiom became the
means to articulate the polarity between the Iranian people in dynamic relation to their
Shahanshah, Muhammad Reza; underscoring hatreds, justifying violence.”20 Ayatollah
Morteza Motahhari also connected the Karbala Paradigm to the pre-Islamic past in his
1968 treatise The Epic of Hoseyn in which he compared the Islamic martyr to Rostam, the
hero of the Shahnameh.21
Khomeini and his followers, Motahhari among them, employed this imagery to
the utmost during the Revolution. Khomeini assumed the characteristics of Rostam the
Hero as well as those of the martyred Imam Husayn; the Shah those of the villainous
monster Zahak and the evil King Yazid, and the entire world became a ta’ziyeh. The
Iranian people became players in their own nation-wide Ashura commemoration played
out over the course of a year, from January 1978 to January 1979. They had a true-to-life
Yazid in the person of the Shah and real bullets, clubs, fire—and martyrs. On
September 8, 1978 alone five to nine hundred people were killed, and they, along with
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the hundreds of others killed throughout the year, were granted martyrdom status that
placed them alongside Iran’s heroes from both the ancient and Islamic eras.22

Figure 7. Classic Coffee House Painting Depicting an Episode in the Shahnameh; a
Scene from a Ta’ziyeh; and a Poster from the Islamic Revolution 23

Mottahedeh especially noted how the fourteen months of the Islamic Revolution
resembled the ta’ziyeh. He describes how during the early days “Iranians looked on with
curiosity, then—with the removal of all barriers between actors and audience—were
drawn into a community of emotion.” People brought themselves into the theater to the
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extent that they put their own bloody handprints—a familiar symbol from the ta’ziyeh—
on placards and into graffiti.24 This passion sustained the demonstrations that ultimately
led to the Shah’s abdication and flight from Iran in January of 1979.25

Figure 8. Blood of the Martyrs 26

This theatricality extended to the second phase of the Islamic Revolution, during
which competing factions, especially those who recognized the inconsistencies between
Khomeini’s earlier statements denying any desire to take over the government and his
subsequent seizure of power, began struggling for power. The November 1979 seizure of
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the U.S. Embassy in Tehran then “became the central drama of the revolution.”27
Khomeini used the images of the hostage crisis, especially those of having faced down
and beaten the ultimate symbol of the West—the United States—as the “enduring motif
of the revolution.” For Iranian hard-line revolutionaries the embassy seizure consolidated
the revolution’s Islamic character.28
Centrality of Justice
Khomeini deliberately and overtly built his appeal for vilayet-i faqih around Shi’i
ideology and mythology, because “though the shah claimed legitimacy on the basis of
hereditary right, and implied it through divine guidance in titles such as Zill Allah
(Shadow of God), or played upon the concept of farr-i izadi (divine grace), what mattered
was that he should conform to the shari’a” and ensure that his reign was “associated with
justice.”29 However, justice is also the most important principle that a traditional Iranian
ruler must uphold in order to retain the farr-i izadi.30 The Shah’s perceived inability to
serve as a just ruler in accordance with the shari’a was therefore also seen as a sign that
he had lost the farr. Both beliefs produced the same result; he no longer held the loyalty
27
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of his subjects, and in time-honored Iranian parlance this meant that the farr had deserted
him.31
Khomeini’s writing from exile during the 1960s and 70s particularly focused on
the many injustices the Shah was inflicting on Iranian Muslims. Vanessa Martin provides
a vivid description of the response these treatises elicited from his most ardent supporters,
the artisans and merchants of the traditional bazaar networks. She notes that their
“abiding ideal was that of justice, particularly in the struggle against a state which, if not
necessarily perceived as unjust, was certainly seen as liable to be so….” They believed
“Iran as a just state under a brave and just leader represented yet another utopia in its
cultural tradition,” and that
The paragon of the believers was the Imam Husain, whose passion and
martyrdom exemplified resistance to tyranny and self-sacrifice in the
cause of Islam and of justice. The other heroes of this community were
the just ruler, Anushirvan, and the legendary warriors of Firdausi’s
eleventh-century poetic epic, the Shahnama, such as Jamshid and
Rustam, depicted in bristly combat in the pictures which adorned their
coffee-houses.32
The bazaris therefore responded to Khomeini’s messages, which focused on these very
traditional themes, at a visceral level. They came to recognize Khomeini as a legendary
Iranian hero, renowned for his courage and piety, standing tall and on par with the
mythical figures of the Shahnameh and the ta’ziyeh.33
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Figure 9. Rostam in Coffee House Painting; Khomeini in Revolutionary Poster 34

As Khomeini’s reputation spread beyond the bazaar, it became clear to a growing
number of the members of the organizations opposing the Shah that Khomeini was the
latest in the line of just rulers endowed with the farr-i izadi, and that he was ready to
assume his place as the rightful ruler of Iran. Khomeini fit the characteristic pattern for
founders of Iranian temporal dynasties as defined in Iranian mythology, specifically in
the Shahnameh. 35 He exhibited signs of greatness when the nation was faced with the
peril created by a tyrannical leader. Like many of the ancient kings and heroes, he was
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an orphan; his father was killed when he was an infant, and his mother and the aunt who
helped raise him both died when he was only sixteen. He was a sayyīd, a descendent of
the Prophet Muhammad through the seventh Imam, and therefore a member of the Shi’i
‘royal’ family—as well as the Iranian, through the Sassanian princess Shahrbanou.
Khomeini had been persecuted by an ‘evil’ shah; and, according to widespread legends,
his father had been murdered by either bandits in the employ of the Qajars or agents of
Reza Khan (despite the detail that Reza Khan’s coup was almost two decades after the
crime).36 Khomeini therefore complied with the “change of dynasty narrative” that is
found in the Shahnameh and actual historical events. This recurring tale relates how a
…new king, often related to one of the ruling houses, has been brought
up in humble circumstances far from his future seat of power, tasting
hardship and deprivation. He has been unrecognized until the decisive
moment comes, when his royal attributes show in his countenance and
behavior. He vanquishes, often with divine blessing, the corrupt holders
of power and institutes a reign of peace and prosperity.37
Most significantly, Khomeini was in exile from 1964 until his return after the Revolution
in 1979. As the revolution progressed, his supporters distributed his sermons through an
international telephone and cassette tape recording black-market network that conveyed
them almost instantaneously to Tehran where they were played in mosques, sold on the
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streets and sent throughout the country.38 He remained in contact with his followers, yet
not visible to them—as if he were in occultation.
Khomeini as Imam and the Mahdi
This distance played to an enduring Shi’i political archetype; it is a precise
reflection of “how the Shi’i collective memory remembers its last figure of cosmic
authority—the Hidden Imam.”39 To add to the resemblance, Khomeini conducted a
divination that revealed he would die in Qom. His followers interpreted this prophecy as
proof that he would return from exile, and their anticipation of his return led to further
elaboration of, and speculation regarding, Khomeini’s resemblance to the Mahdi—as
well as to the Zoroastrian Saoshyant and the Shahnameh heroes who also experienced
occultation.40
Khomeini also resembled the Mahdi and pre-Islamic kings and heroes with his
reported illumination, the most common manifestation of the farr-i izadi. His followers
frequently referred to him as a source of light, with a shining face or a halo, and,
“determined to sacralize the charisma,” they posted images of “Khomeini’s face shining
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Figure 10. Revolutionary Posters Depicting Khomeini’s “Brilliance” 41

forth from the sky, emanating from the sun as if surrounded by a halo.”42 Even western
observers related stories about his radiance; the political economist Marvin Zonis states:
“There is a light around Ayatollah Khomeini. I think it is only the power of that charisma
that has made it possible to overcome the differences among the clerics.”43
The most explicit account of Khomeini’s brilliance comes from Kuffash Bashi,
who was on the airplane that returned Khomeini to Iran from France in 1979. Bashi tells
the story of how “Suddenly [the] Imam rose from the place where he was sitting and went
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to the front of the plane in order to pray. His face was truly shining and a halo of light
could be seen around it. I swear that I saw that halo of light around the perimeter of his
face.”44 This account replicates Ferdowsi’s description of kings who were “as splendid
as the sun,” because they radiated the light of the farr.45
The farr is also commonly associated with moonlight in Iranian folklore and
Zoroastrian texts and iconography. The Sassanians had specific symbols for the farr that
linked it to the moon, and their terminology for the farr included references to the king’s
image as a reflection.46 Ferdowsi often referred to kings and heroes as looking like “a tall
cypress tree topped by the full moon.” 47 During the early days of the Revolution an
unnamed “religious authority” reportedly saw Khomeini’s face reflected on the full
moon, and this vision was interpreted as an omen of divine approval.48 As Khomeini’s
charismatic power increased, seeing his face on the moon became a revolutionary loyalty
test. Khomeini’s followers would ask people if they could see the image, and if the
answer was no it was a clear indication of insufficient devotion to the Revolution and
Khomeini, and the punishments for this infraction could be swift and brutal. As a result,
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even educated Iranians reported having seen Khomeini’s face on the full moon.49
Chelkowski and Dabashi describe this as “the intentional imposition of meaning and
significance on an otherwise innocent natural object” with “the full power of the Persian
and Shi’i symbolic signification of the moon” and communicating a message that led the
Iranian collective consciousness back to images of the farr-i izadi.50
Khomeini’s mythical status was extended to the point that he was granted the title
‘Imam,’ even though, as Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari, one of Khomeini’s disciples,
wrote: “in Shi’ite parlance, the word [Imam] is applied to those who lead to Allah who
are immune from sin—and these are only twelve.”51 Despite this historical distinction,
Khomeini’s militant followers “played upon the mystical connotations of the word
‘imam’ to imply perfection, sainthood and imbuement with the divine.”52 They began
referring to him as The Imam in the early 1970s, and they did this in Persian, so there
would be no confusion with the title ‘imam’ in Arabic parlance, where it is commonly
used to refer to ordinary mosque and community leaders.53 As the Revolution
progressed, prayer leaders began to refer to Khomeini as simply “Imam,” without his
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surname, a title Iranians had not bestowed on any living person since the sixteenth
century.54
Leftists also adopted the use of the term Imam to refer to Khomeini in late 1978,
“invoking Ali Shari’ati’s equation of the Islamic Imām with the Weberian ‘charismatic
leader,’ one who articulates the inchoate desires of the people.”55 Shari’ati’s followers
contended that Khomeini was not just an ordinary ayatollah, but rather a charismatic
Imam, and that his exalted stature would allow him to lead the revolution that would
bring about the long-awaited and utopian classless society.56 These secular
revolutionaries consciously promoted the use of this loaded term as a “tactical means to
the strategic end of overthrowing the shah;” they believed that the anticipated end result
of their “somewhat cynical manipulation of the superstitions of the people” justified their
actions.57
Khomeini’s followers thus purposely confused the Shi’i concept of Imam with the
Sufi ideas regarding the “Perfect Man.” This principle states there is always one man one
earth who serves as the “perfect channel of grace from God to man.” The Perfect Man,
also known as the qutb, the Pole, or the Axis of the Universe, holds the authority to teach
the Sufi path and lead the community, a right that has been passed down from master to
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student over the generations, traditionally reaching back to Ali. This idea directly
conflicts with the Shi’i belief that the twelfth Imam is the living qutb, even though he is
in occultation; however, Khomeini’s followers persisted in their projection of these Sufic
concepts onto Khomeini despite this inconsistency.58 They “expanded use of the term
[Imam] beyond its common meaning, until it reached the point at which they used the
designation to imply that he was almost of the same rank as the twelve ‘rightful’ Imams
of the Shi’ah, or perhaps of the same rank as the last Shi’i Imam who was to return from
Occultation as the expected messiah.”59 They chanted “slogans implying that he rules by
divine right and proclaiming that cognizance of the Hidden Imam is possible only
through love of Khomeini.”60 They ranked Khomeini as a ‘Supernatural Being,’ beside,
or immediately after, God and the Hidden Imam.61
Khomeini took full advantage of this projection; encouraging it with his
mysticism and by not denying that he was the Imam. He initially had his portraits
carefully labeled ‘nāyeb-e Imām’, deputy to the Imam, “but his propaganda handlers
could not resist, and he did not object to, the play on the utopian resonance of being
called an ‘Imām.’”62 He shrewdly permitted a “degree of ambiguity [to] prevail over the
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precise nature of his religious charisma” and he ensured the 1979 constitution
institutionalized his status as imam.63
Zonis and Brumberg precisely summarize Khomeini’s association with the term
Imam:
“There is a strong implication in the principle of vilayet-i faqih that
Khomeini’s claim to the leadership of the Shi’is is based on divine
power, on his having inherited the infallibility and the divinity of the
Imams themselves. By making sure that he is referred to as the
Representative of the Imam (nayeb-e Imam) in the constitution and the
official press; by claiming that he “takes refuge with God and his
miracle,” and through his insistence that the “country’s aspiration is for
the emergence of the hidden Imam,” Khomeini suggests that his return to
Iran, if not synonymous with the Return of the Twelfth Imam himself,
has at least heralded that return. Moreover, given Khomeini’s evident
charismatic appeal and the willingness of a good part of Iran’s urban
poor to accord him divine power, it is clear that Khomeini rules by virtue
of an attributed or claimed divine right.”64
This quote highlights the fact that Khomeini also “ingeniously exploited the Shi’ite
Messianic yearning” by encouraging his association with not just the Imams, but with the
twelfth Imam, the Mahdi, specifically. Ayatollah Yusef Sanei, a member of the
Assembly of Guardians, went so far as to assert that Khomeini was equal to the twelfth
Imam with the statement: “The Iranian nation knows that all the officials in the country
are dependent on the velayat-e faqih [Khomeini], that is, the Vali-ye ‘Asr – the Hidden
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Imam.”65 Thus “…with the fourteenth Islamic century about to expire and a new one to
begin, the quasi-millennial charisma of the man they called Imam was compounded for
the young militant clerics by his image as the Renovator (mojadded) of the century.”66
He allowed his followers to refer to him not simply as ‘Imam’ but also specifically as the
‘Imam of the Age,’ and the ‘Lord of Time,’ titles reserved for the Mahdi; making sure
that those who did not consider him the Mahdi were at least open to the idea that he was
the precursor of the Mahdi.67
Khomeini’s intensely devoted followers also began to describe him as divinely
inspired, with a place among the pantheon of Islamic prophets. The journalist Clifford
May describes standing in a crowd in Qom in 1979
“…as Khomeini appeared on the roof of a modest bungalow, wearing
black robes and turban. He did not smile like a politician would. His
face was stern, like a father gazing on an errant son. He slowly raised
his hand. The crowd erupted in frenzy. ‘There have been only a few
such figures in history,’ an Iranian instructed me. ‘Moses, Jesus,
Muhammad—and now there is Khomeini.’”68
This mythical status, along with Khomeini’s careful construction of vilayet-i faqih, put
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him on an equal standing with the twelve Imams, and allowed him to claim both temporal
and religious rule of the Iranian Islamic Republic.
Vilayet-i Faqih and the Farr-i Izadi
Khomeini was able to recombine these dual lines of authority in part because of
the myth of the farr-i izadi, its earlier assumption into Shi’i tradition, and the way his
followers related Khomeini and his ideas regarding Islamic government to the ancient
conception of Iranian kingship. Vilayet-i faqih is generally described as an innovation
because there is no ideological precedent that justifies direct clerical rule in Iranian
society, and it does not comply with Shi’i norms that call for the ‘ulama to distance
themselves from temporal government, which is traditionally considered illegitimate
during the absence of the twelfth Imam.69 Khomeini works around this difficulty “by
unequivocally declaring the faqih the rightful successor to the Imams,” and thus
accrediting the Leader with the Imams’ political and religious abilities and
responsibilities.70
Vilayet-i faqih is therefore, when viewed through the prism of ancient Iranian
history and mythology, and early Shi’i belief, not a modern concept. It is instead the
expression of classical Iranian principles of idealized divine leadership; a theological
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innovation, but not an original political initiative.71 There are distinct aspects of
Khomeini’s design that echo the farr and illustrate how “the Islamic Republic
institutionally reproduced royal charisma, although in a different jargon.”72 The
combination of “the glories of kingship and the Good Religion in a single person” as
stated in the Zoroastrian Denkard, and echoed in Ardashir’s third century declaration that
“religion and kingship are twins,” has traditionally been considered a mystical, utopian,
state of affairs.73 Khomeini’s vilayet-i faqih reunites the two farrs of kingship and
religion in the all-powerful faqih who fills the office of Supreme Leader in the very real
Islamic Republic of Iran.74
Khomeini knew the “codes” for the transmission of Iranian cultural memory. He
used them, and he allowed his followers to use them even more blatantly, to recombine
the dual lines of temporal and religious authority and to take on the shah’s role and
responsibilities.
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CONCLUSION
It is a myth, not a mandate, a fable not a logic, and a symbol
rather than reason by which men are moved.
— Irwin Edman 1
Khomeini described vilayet-i faqih as “a blueprint for an Islamic government,”
but in practice it turned out to be “little more than a criticism of the status quo and
promises of a better form of government under the guidance of the clergy;” the old
system “painted with religious colors.”2 Abol-hassan Banisadr Bani Sadr, the Islamic
Republic of Iran’s first president, dubbed vilayet-i faqih “political despotism under the
guise of religion;” and Mehdi Bazargan, the IRI’s first prime minister, referred to it as a
“clerical regency,” with clerics not just monopolizing the position of Supreme Leader,
but all positions at every level across the entire span of the Republic’s government.3
Khomeini had essentially used Shi’i anti-monarchical political rhetoric to replace
royal authority with religious charisma and install himself as a theocratic monarch.4 His
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followers accepted his leadership in part because of a deeply ingrained Iranian cultural
predisposition for government by divine approval based in Iranian mythology and
assumed into the Shi’i traditions. They believed Khomeini’s intense charisma indicated
he had been chosen by God to rule their community; and as a result they treated him not
simply with the respect and devotion due a renowned cleric and spiritual leader, but as a
king endowed with the farr-i izadi. Implementation of vilayet-i faqih invested Khomeini
as the ultimate religious and secular ruler, and resulted in a government that had the
characteristics of, and operated as, a monarchy—with the head of state exercising
absolute power.5
Khomeini paradoxically created “a power structure that was not much different
from the monarchical absolutism he so vehemently opposed” during the Revolution.6 He
defied shari’a law by putting the state above the sacred when he changed the position of
supreme jurist from leader of the Shi’i religious community to the totalitarian ruler of the
Iranian political community. He displaced theology with politics and gave political goals
priority over religious doctrine in order to claim his position as Supreme Leader of Iran.7
He then, in 1989, overtly put nationalism above Islam in a revised constitution by
eliminating the requirement for the Supreme Leader to be a marja or to be chosen by
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popular acclaim, thus negating his primary stated justification for vilayet-i faqih—that the
ruler must be the most learned jurist.8 Further changes have been proposed that introduce
“the modern concepts of ‘majority rule,’ ‘social contract’ and ‘representation’” into the
process of choosing a new Supreme Leader, none of which are congruent with traditional
Shi’i methods for recognizing knowledge and wisdom in a faqih.9
The only significant difference between vilayet-i faqih and an Iranian Islamic
monarchy is therefore a change in the pool of those eligible to serve in the top position.
The old system allowed anyone who could manage to grasp power and hold onto it to
take over as the shah. Khomeini, by enshrining vilayet-i faqih in the new Islamic
Republic of Iran’s Constitution, with his explicit example stated in the document, tried to
remove the position of Supreme Leader from the secular realm and to limit authority to
the most learned members of the clergy. However, Khomeini’s assumption of power by
means of his own distinct charisma resulted in a governmental system Bazargan
described as “a dress sewn to fit the Ayatollah,” that could not be passed on to an heir.10
Therefore, like the Iranian kings who preceded him, he could not ensure his chosen
successor was able to obtain the farr.
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Clerics remained in charge of Iran’s government after Khomeini’s death in 1989;
however, they were of lesser rank and “ultimate authority was no longer exercised by the
supreme religious sources or by prominent theologians.” Ali Hoseyni Khāmene’i, the
new Supreme Leader, was not the most learned jurist available and he did not gain his
position by popular consensus. Khamenei was instead, against all traditions, both Iranian
and Islamic, ‘promoted’ to the position by the religio-politicians then in power and forced
upon the Iranian people.11 He has consequently not been able to obtain the same mystical
power that sustained Khomeini—the farr-i izadi.12
The farr, however, continues to be an important concept in Iranian power politics,
and the current Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has been trying to
demonstrate that he has obtained it. After his 2006 speech at the United Nations
Ahmadinejad described being “protected by a sacred halo of light” while he was
speaking, and how God had fixed all the world leader’s eyes upon him, not allowing
them to blink. Ahmadinejad’s critics, believing these statements would discredit him,
posted a video of him making them on the Internet. This effort appears to have
backfired; many of the viewers have instead posted comments that recognize
Ahmadinejad’s words as proof of his “genius” and “divine wisdom,” and cite his
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experience as “the miracle of the third millennium,” indicating they believe Iran’s
president has gained the farr-i izadi.13
There are many Iranians who quite vehemently disagree with this estimation; and
the government has become increasingly repressive in their attempts to limit potential
revolutionary action stirring among these non-believers. As a result, the regime is
beginning to resemble those that, in the past, had lost the farr-i izadi. The people
recognize that their leaders have not gained the farr, and that they now have what Siamak
Khatami described in 2002 as:
…a new set of decision makers who use religion only as a shield to hide
behind, and behind which to commit all sorts of atrocities as well as acts
of corruption, while ensuring that anybody who opposed them would be
labeled as ‘anti-religion’ and, by implication, ‘anti-God,’ and persecuted
jailed, exiled or killed.14
The symbols Khomeini and his followers exploited so skillfully in their attacks on
Muhammad Reza Shah are now being used against the Islamic regime by bloggers,
artists, and writers; all of whom can circulate their renderings on the Internet in minutes
to a worldwide audience. The most obvious example of how these new technologies are
being exploited is in the many UTube videos of Shahnameh readings and performances,
editorials and their associated cartoons that allude to the epic poem as well as serious
artwork and poetry with Shahnameh themes. These new renderings are abundant and

13

Abbas Milani, “Pious Populist: Understanding the Rise of Iran’s President,”
Boston Review, 2007, http://bostonreview.net/BR32.6/milani.php (accessed March 2009).
14

Siamak Khatami, Iran: A View From Within, (London: Janus, 2004), iv.
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easily accessed by anyone with an Internet connection as new nationalist movements with
democratic ideals challenge the Islamic government using the same persistent symbols.

Figure 11. 2007 Political Cartoon with Allusions to the Shahnameh 15

Figure 12. Fereydoun Ave’s 2004 “Rostam and Sohrab” 16

15

Serendip, “Islamic Zahak Occupiers,” Serendip, 2007, http://fleetingperusal.
blogspot.com/ 2007/10/islamic-zahak-occupiers.html (accessed May 2008).
16

Fereydoun Ave, “Rustam and Sorhab,” 2004, http://www.godsbecomingmen
.com/fa.htm (accessed April 2008).
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A particularly ironic story is the one Iranian-American scholar Reza Aslan tells in
the April 30, 2006 New York Times about a young boy he stopped in the act of scrawling
graffiti on a stone block at Persepolis. Aslan states that when he looked to see what the
boy had written he “immediately recognized a verse, familiar to many Iranians” from the
Shahnameh:
Damn this world, damn this time, damn this fate,
That uncivilized Arabs have come to make me Muslim.17
Aslan’s story, and the couplet the boy chose to quote, bring to mind a line from the
historian Stephen Humphreys: “However rationally conceived and pursued a policy may
be, then, it is ultimately grounded in fallible but extremely powerful images of the past.
Policy is in a sense the struggle of memory to control the future.”18 The Iranian Islamic
regime is engaged in the same struggle they were in thirty years ago—the key difference
is that this time they are fighting on the other side. They are being forced to recognize
that leadership is a construct of the imagination, and that it is impossible to lead a nation
without the support of its citizens. A dictator can rule by force without this cooperation,
but he cannot sustain a viable government without a people’s belief in his legitimacy—
and in Iran that means gaining, either consciously or subconsciously, the mystical,
mythical force of the farr-i izadi.

17

Reza Aslan, “The Epic of Iran,” New York Times Online, April 30, 2006,
www.nytimes.com/2006/04/30/books/review/30aslan.html?pagewanted=print (accessed
April 2008)
18

R. Stephen Humphreys, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a
Troubled Age, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 85.
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